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Abstract
This paper is focused on privacy issues related to the prefix part of IPv6 addresses.
Long-lived prefixes may introduce additional tracking opportunities for communication
partners and third parties. We outline a number of prefix alteration schemes that may be
deployed to maintain the unlinkability of users’ activities. While none of the schemes will
solve all privacy problems on the Internet on their own, we argue that the development
of practical prefix alteration techniques constitutes a worthwile avenue to pursue: They
would allow Internet Service Providers to increase the attainable privacy level well above
the status quo in today’s IPv4 networks.
1 Introduction
Many Internet service providers (ISPs) throughout the world are now in the process of inte-
grating IPv6 into their Internet access products for retail customers and corporate clients alike.
One of the most important features of the IPv6 protocol is its huge address space. This will
enable users to assign a life-long stable, unique and globally routable IP address to each per-
sonal device. In principle, all users will be able to set up public services at home and be able to
communicate from and to their devices from any point in the network. The resulting end-to-end
reachability is considered a major improvement over the current situation [6]. While the initial
IPv6 specification from 1995 does already contain a variety of security considerations (namely,
message integrity protection as well as encryption based on IPsec), privacy aspects have not
played a major role in the beginning [4].
The overall design of IPv6 and especially the property of end-to-end reachability are in
conflict with the desirable privacy property of unlinkability, i. e., an attacker should not be able
to relate multiple activities of a user based on his or her (possibly long-lived) IP address (cf.
[9] for a more formal description of unlinkability). According to the initial specification of IPv6
[4] network nodes derive the interface identifier part of an IPv6 address (one of the two parts of
an IPv6 address, see Fig. 1) from the Medium Access Control (MAC) address of the respective
network adapter, which is determined at the time of manufacturing and does not change over
time. As a result, every IPv6 node can be uniquely identified via its static interface identifier.
This design has received much attention in the privacy community and was resolved with the
specification of the so-called IPv6 Privacy Extensions [5]. Once Privacy Extensions are enabled,
a node will choose a random interface identifier, which is changed on a regular basis (e. g. once
per day).
In this paper we want to draw the attention to another privacy issue, which has been often
overlooked so far: Tracking the activities of Internet users may not only be possible because
of long-lived interface identifiers, but also if the first part of their IPv6 addresses, the prefix
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Figure 1: IPv6 Address Prefix and Interface Identifier
that is assigned by the ISP to the customer, remains constant over time. In fact, according to
initial press statements released so far ([3], for instance), some ISPs, including German market
leader Deutsche Telekom, appear to be planning to assign long-lived prefixes to the customers
of residential broadband products by default. This move would effectively decrease the privacy
of many users, who are connected to the Internet with dynamic IPv4 addresses that change on
a daily basis today.
Long-lived IPv6 prefixes would introduce a tracking mechanism, which could be used in
addition to HTTP cookies. With tracking cookies ad networks such as Doubleclick or Google
Analytics are already collecting sizeable amounts of user data for the purpose of profiling
today. Long-lived IPv6 prefixes would allow them to maintain linkability even if users deleted
all cookies in their browser. This is different from the current situation because tracking solely
based on IPv4 addresses is usually infeasible: First of all, a large number of users is connected
to the Internet using dynamic IPv4 addresses that change frequently, and secondly, multiple
users may share a single IP address at a given point in time using Network Address Translation
(NAT) or proxies.
With the growing awareness and driven by the recent “Do-not-Track” (cf. [12]) discussions
we expect that an increasing number of users will eventually understand how tracking works
and how it can be prevented by Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Instead of introducing new
tracking possibilities with IPv6, ISPs could make use of the huge address space of IPv6 in
order to offer improved privacy to their customers. This chance was already mentioned by the
German IPv6 Council [1] and should now be discussed further.
In this paper we propose three design options relating to the assignment of IPv6 address
prefixes to customers, which could be implemented by ISPs to protect the unlinkability of
their users’ actions against third parties. Our techniques consist of frequently changing address
prefixes, distributing concurrent traffic across multiple prefixes and sharing prefixes among
multiple users.
2 Related Work
Sakurai et al. [11] propose a mechanism that allows two nodes to communicate privately by
switching through a list of previously negotiated IPv6 interface identifiers. The objective of
their technique is to provide relationship anonymity against eavesdroppers. To this end the
nodes establish a secret key (possibly out-of-band), which is used to independently derive a
shared list of randomised IP addresses in a deterministic way. During communication both
nodes iterate over their address list in a synchronised manner and assign an ephemeral IP
address to their respective network interfaces. This approach resembles frequency hopping that
is used in many wireless networks today.
Dunlop et al. [2] present the “Moving Target IPv6 Defense”, another technique that dy-
namically obscures sender and receiver IPv6 addresses. The solution is quite similar to the one
by Sakurai et al. as it replaces the interface identifier of sender and receiver addresses in a
synchronised yet random manner using a pre-shared secret key. Additionaly, all packets are
encapsulated in an encrypted tunnel to prevent payload analysis. The authors also include an
empirical evaluation of their technique that demonstrates its practical feasibility.
The aforementioned approaches by Sakurai et al. and Dunlop et al. show that IPv6 offers a
working foundation that can be used to implement privacy-enhancing techniques. While their
proposals are of independent interest, they do not solve the privacy issues caused by long-lived
prefixes we are interested in: First of all, they operate on the interface identifier only and
completely neglect tracking via constant prefixes. Secondly, they require senders and receivers
to negotiate a symmetric secret key before any communication can take place, which may
scale poorly for the whole Internet. And finally, they protect only against tracking efforts by
outsiders, while the two communication partners themselves are assumed to be trusting each
other. Such a trust relationship does not exist in our scenario, in which users want to protect
themselves against tracking by web sites or ad networks.
Lindqvist and Tapio [7] propose to implement a protocol stack virtualisation technique in
the operating system of networked clients. Instead of only changing IP addresses, their solution
takes into account that identifiers on other layers of the network stack can also be used to
track users (e. g., MAC addresses and port numbers). The design requires a locally installed
translation daemon that replaces all identifiers on all layers at once for every new outbound flow
of the client, which ensures that consecutive as well as concurrent activities remain unlinkable.
A prototypical implementation of the system is shown to be compatible with several well-known
Linux applications. As it solely operates on the client side, protocol stack virtualisation cannot
influence the provider-controlled address prefixes, though.
The most relevant related work for our scenario has been published by Raghavan et al. [10].
The authors observe that all currently active customers of an ISP form an anonymity group, in
which individual users can hide if addresses assigned to the customers are changed frequently.
ISPs are supposed to assign two addresses to each customer: a hidden address that is replaced
with a randomly assigned address for every outbound flow from the customer’s network as well
as a sticky address that remains constant over time to provide for reachability. The ISP runs a
network address translation gateway that rewrites source and destination addresses on the fly.
Although the technique is only described in the context of existing IPv4 networks it could be
adapted to IPv6 prefixes. While Raghavan et al. present a single alternative, which resembles
our Scheme 2, we focus on surveying and discussing various schemes that are conceivable in
IPv6 networks in this paper.
3 Unlinkability via Prefix Alteration
In order to overcome the privacy issues of long-lived IPv6 address prefixes, we propose to design
and implement privacy-enhancing solutions, which provide unlinkable addresses. It is not the
goal of this paper to provide a working solution. Instead we want to outline possible future
research directions by sketching out three conceivable schemes with distinct properties.
3.1 Scheme 1: Prefix Hopping
We assume that an adversary can link all activities of a user that are carried out using the same
prefix, but cannot establish a link once the prefix of the user is changed (temporal unlinkability).
This basic level of unlinkability is already available today: Many ISPs terminate the broadband
connection of residential customers in regular intervals, e. g., every 24 hours, and assign their
customers a new IP address once the connection is established again. Prefix Hopping improves
privacy by changing prefixes of customers more frequently, e. g., within a few seconds or
minutes. Consequently, for this scheme all outbound traffic of a customer’s router uses a single
prefix within a certain time frame (see Fig. 2).
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Figure 2: Prefix Hopping
Switching to a new prefix should not be implemented by terminating the broadband con-
nection, which would result in poor usability due to frequent service interruptions. Instead,
seemless techniques such as short DHCP lease times in conjunction with deprecating previously
assigned addresses should be considered. The level of privacy attainable by a certain value
of the alteration frequency should be studied in empirical evaluations using recorded traffic
to determine reasonable values. Apart from this parameter there are several implementation
options, whose impact on usability and privacy must be considered, such as:
1. Do existing TCP connections have to be terminated (which impacts usability) once the
prefix is replaced to guarantee unlinkability or can they be kept alive?
2. Should the current prefix be announced by the customer’s router on the internal network
(which may cause issues on clients that cannot deal with frequent renumbering) or should
it be hidden from the clients by employing network address translation techniques on the
customers’ router or at the ISP end?
The advantage of Prefix Hopping is that it can be implemented without major changes to
the existing protocols. On the other hand its protection is only limited due to the fact that all
concurrent traffic remains linkable.
3.2 Scheme 2: Prefix Bouquets
In this scheme the ISP does not only delegate one prefix to each customer at a given point
in time, but a whole set of prefixes, a bouquet, at once. This allows the customers to split
their outbound traffic flows across a vast number of different prefixes so that even concurrent
activities become unlinkable for adversaries (see Fig. 3). This scheme improves privacy by
offering unlinkability on the transactional level, i. e., on a per-connection (TCP) or even on a
per-packet (UDP) basis.
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Figure 3: Prefix Bouquets
Again, various implementations options with different usability and privacy properties are
conceivable:
1. One extreme case is to use a different prefix for every outgoing flow, i. e., every
new TCP connection, every stream of related UDP packets, every single ICMP packet)
regardless of its respective destination. This makes it impossible to link concurrent activ-
ities involving different destinations as well as consecutive requests that target the same
destination. Neither web sites nor ad networks would be able to aggregate requests of
their users based on the IP address any more. There may be compatibility issues, though:
for security reasons some web applications may terminate HTTP sessions (maintained
with cookies) if the source address changes between two consecutive requests.
2. A more practical solution may be to re-use prefixes on a per-destination basis. This
will still improve privacy significantly because there is no direct linkability on the IP layer
between destinations if destinations collude. On the other hand, this variant cannot offer
unlinkability against an ad network whose web server (which has a constant destination
address) is accessed during visits of different web sites.
With Prefix Bouquets ISPs can offer users unlinkability with various granularity, in princi-
ple even on a per-packet basis. This scheme cannot be implemented with currently available
techniques and protocols, though. Even so, a transparent solution could be implemented using
a network address translation service on the customer’s router or at the ISP end.
3.3 Scheme 3: Prefix Sharing
It can be expected that not all customers will need a “whole” IPv6 subnet, which would typically
support on the order of 264 hosts, at their disposal: They either do not have so many devices
or they do not have to directly address so many network devices from the public Internet at
all times. Prefix Sharing exploits this observation by allocating a single prefix to multiple
customers that form an anonymity group. Instead of delegating a unique prefix to each
customer, the ISP now assigns individual (randomised) IPv6 addresses to its customers. As
all IP addresses belong to the same IPv6 prefix, tracking individual users based on the prefix
becomes impossible. Segregation of the traffic of customers sharing the same prefix can be
enforced via a firewall deployed within the ISP’s router. There are different implementation
options for Prefix Sharing:
1. One option may be for the customer’s router to forward DHCP address requests of
network devices from the customer’s network to the ISP. The DHCP server at the ISP will
then assign the device an available IP address. While this variant can be implemented
with off-the-shelf techniques, there may be privacy issues: due to the address requests the
ISP may gain sensitive information about the customer’s network and habits.
2. Another option would be for the ISP to pre-allocate a set of random IPv6 addresses for
each customer (see Fig. 4) and distribute the whole set to the customers’ routers once the
broadband session is established. In this case IP address assignment would be carried out
in the customer’s router and remain hidden from the ISP. Distributing sets of addresses
requires changes to the protocols running during session establishment and the software
running on routers, though.
3. Prefix Sharing could also be implemented without any changes on the customers’ side via
network address translation (NAT) at the ISP end.
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Figure 4: Prefix Sharing
This scheme requires the ISP to keep track of individual addresses: On the one hand the
ISP has to make sure that there are no address collisions at a given point in time, on the other
hand from a privacy perspective it would be desirable that individual addresses are assigned to
multiple customers over time.
With Prefix Sharing network nodes must still replace their address with a new one on a
frequent basis in order to prevent tracking based on the interface identifier part of the address.
Coming from the theory of anonymity and unobservability, Prefix Sharing seems to be
the canonical way to implement privacy on the IP(v6) level. Most practical solutions for
anonymous communication make use of proxy-based solutions (such as virtual private networks,
HTTP proxies and NAT) where multiple users share a single IP address, which usually causes
performance and scalability issues. The scalability issue of Prefix Sharing is tied to the number
of customers that can share a single prefix as well as the effort necessary to maintain the
mapping table, in which the ISP stores the addresses that are assigned to a given customer.
The latter of these two issues will be briefly discussed in Sect. 4. Therefore, Prefix Sharing may
be seen as the last option if other solutions with better scalability are not usable.
4 Implementation Considerations
In this section we will discuss requirements and considerations for the practical implementation
of the aforementioned address alteration schemes.
Combination with Privacy Extensions. For prefix alteration to be effective it must always
be used in conjunction with IPv6 Privacy Extensions [5]. Whenever unlinkability is to be
achieved by a different prefix, the interface identifier part of an IPv6 address has to be changed
as well. As the required synchronization may be difficult to achieve in practice, integrating
both techniques should be considered. The integration is straightforward in case the schemes
are implemented using NAT techniques on the customer’s router or by the ISP.
Control over Prefix Alteration. An important design decision is the question which party
is to be in control of the prefix alteration process. We see two options here:
• The alteration can be fully delegated to the ISP, which could use network translation
techniques to rewrite addresses accordingly. As customers are already willing to trust
their ISP with their traffic, this delegation does not introduce new privacy issues. We
assume that ISPs that actually do deploy prefix alteration techniques are going to support
their customers, rather than undermine their efforts to establish unlinkability against
third parties. The delegation may be advantageous for implementation reasons because
customer premises equipment would remain unmodified.
• A fundamentally different option is to carry out the alteration in the customer’s
router. In this case the ISP would have to offer the router a set of prefixes once the
connection is established for the router’s disposal. This option requires changes to the
software on customer premises equipment as well as on the ISP end, though.
Generating and Storing Collision-free Random Sets of Addresses. Multiple prefixes
(Scheme 1 and 2) or addresses (Scheme 3) assigned to one customer over time must not be
linkable by an adversary, i. e., addresses allocated to a customer must not span a closed range
or share all a common (shorter) prefix. Therefore, ISPs need techniques to generate a collision-
free series of random addresses for each customer.
A naive approach would be to store pre-generated sets of addresses for each customer in the
ISP’s routers. This could be infeasible due to poor scalability, though. Another option is to
implement a network address translation scheme that substitutes addresses on the fly with a
tweakable cipher as proposed in [10].
We propose to also take time-memory-tradeoff techniques such as rainbow tables (cf. [8]) into
consideration for this purpose. This approach employs a cryptographic hash function as well
as a so-called reduction function, which maps hash values back to random IP addresses. The
ISP can generate a list of random IP addresses for a customer by starting out with a random
address. A random chain of addresses is then obtained by applying the hash function and the
reduction function in alternating manner a fixed number of times. Only the last hash value
and the first address of a chain have to be stored in the routing table. In order to determine
for which customer an incoming packet (having a random address) is destined, the ISP looks
up the address in the rainbow table. For a detailed description of the technique we refer the
reader to [8].
In a number of countries ISPs are obliged to store the mapping between issued addresses and
customers for an extended period of time (data retention) in order to be able to answer enquiries
by law enforcement agencies. Tweakable ciphers or rainbow tables may help to reduce the
possibly demanding storage requirements caused by the large numbers of prefixes or addresses
assigned to each customer.
5 Limitations
On first sight prefix alteration techniques conflict with end-to-end reachability of nodes. After
all, providing services that should be reachable from the public network (incoming connections)
requires static and possibly life-long constant prefixes.
As proposed in [10] end-to-end reachability could be maintained by allocating an additional
static prefix for each customer. Incoming connections to the static address can either be directly
routed to the customer’s network by the ISP or mapped to the customer’s dynamic prefix using
NAT techniques.
Even though address alteration schemes may improve privacy, they cannot protect against
attacks on the higher levels of a communication network. For instance, let’s consider Prefix
Hopping (Scheme 1). Tabbed browsing and client-side JavaScripts can be used to vanquish
unlinkability. Imagine a tracking ad network that displays a banner ad in one tab and re-
downloads it periodically with a client-side script (e. g., every minute). If the banner image
resides at a unique URL, i. e., each user retrieves a different URL, the ad network will be able
to follow along the altered prefixes, rendering Prefix Hopping useless as long as the respective
browser tab is not closed.
Tracking across multiple protocol stack layers is a fundamental issue, though, which can
only be resolved if all identifiers on all layers are switched simultaneously [7]. Therefore, prefix
alteration cannot cure tracking issues that exist in HTTP. Its purpose is rather to make sure
that IPv6 does not introduce new tracking possibilities that will have to be overcome in higher
protocol layers with solutions such as overlay networks (e. g., Tor).
6 Conclusions
IPv6 prefix alteration schemes would help to improve the protection of residential Internet
connections compared to the current state in IPv4.
In the current discussion of the “long-lived prefix issue” privacy advocates limit themselves
to call for maintaining the status quo, i. e., issuing a new prefix upon each manual or daily
reconnect of the customer’s router. We believe that the privacy community must strive for
more: The upcoming introduction of IPv6 is a very seldom opportunity to improve the overall
level of privacy for many users.
However, IPv6 prefix alteration should not be considered as a universal privacy solution for
all applications on the Internet. As long as technologies such as HTTP cookies are enabled on
higher protocol levels, tracking is obviously still possible. Anyway, if privacy on the lower levels
of the protocol stack is ensured, this provides new opportunities for ensuring privacy in the
whole communication network. Future work should look into such issues and evaluate different
alteration schemes in real-world settings.
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